The Policy Behind the Balance: Treasury Limits for UK Group Boards
Photo: HM Treasury, OGL 3, via Wikimedia Commons
Treasury policy has a habit of ageing quietly. It is written when the group has a handful of bank accounts and a simple funding structure. Then the group acquires businesses, opens new entities, changes banks and enters new currencies. The policy remains on the intranet, but the treasury operation has moved on. The board may still see cash reports, but it may no longer know whether the limits in the policy match the risks the group is actually running.
Begin with the mandate map
A treasury review should start with the facts. Build a map of every bank account held by every entity in the group. For each account, record the bank, the entity, the purpose, the signatories, the mandate type, the online banking access, the payment limits, the approval requirements and any overdraft or guarantee attached. Include dormant accounts and accounts that are no longer used. They are easy to forget and often carry the weakest controls.
The map should also show who can change the mandate. After an acquisition, legacy signatories may still have access. After a senior departure, tokens and permissions may remain active. A board does not need to see every account, but it should see the exceptions and the concentration of access.
Test deposit concentration and counterparty limits
Cash is not risk-free simply because it is sitting in a bank. The group may have large balances with a small number of counterparties, or it may have deposits spread across entities in a way that makes consolidated visibility difficult. The policy should set limits by counterparty and by legal entity, with a process for approving exceptions.
Counterparty risk is not only about credit ratings. It includes operational dependence. If a bank provides the group's payment infrastructure, a disruption may affect trading even if the deposits are modest. The review should consider the group's access to liquidity, the maturity of deposits and the ability to move cash between entities when needed.
Examine FX limits and hedging arrangements
Many UK groups have foreign currency exposure without a formal hedging programme. It may sit in purchase commitments, sales invoices, intercompany balances or translation exposure. The policy should state which exposures are managed, which instruments are permitted, what tenor is allowed and who may approve a hedge.
The board does not need to approve each trade. It does need to approve the framework and receive reporting that shows whether the framework is being followed. Ask whether subsidiaries are entering into their own hedges, whether exposures are netted across the group and whether forecasts are reliable enough to support the hedge ratios in the policy. A hedge that is not linked to a genuine exposure is not risk management.
Clarify reporting lines and control
Treasury can sit in the centre, in business units or in a shared service. Each model can work, but the reporting lines should be explicit. Who owns the group cash forecast? Who approves a new bank account? Who monitors covenant compliance? Who is responsible for payment security and fraud controls? Who reports exceptions to the board?
The board pack should include a small set of consistent metrics: cash by entity, debt and maturity profile, covenant headroom, counterparty exposures against limits, FX position and hedge coverage, and any policy exceptions. The pack should be short enough to be read and consistent enough to be compared over time.
Segregation of duties matters. The person who sets up a payment should not be the person who approves it. System access should be reviewed regularly. Intercompany loans should be documented and approved under the authority matrix. These are basic controls, but they are often the first to slip when treasury is distributed.
Review the policy on a cycle and on triggers
An annual review is a minimum. The policy should also be reconsidered after an acquisition, a refinancing, a change of bank, a covenant breach or a significant market event. The review should test whether the limits still reflect the board's risk appetite. A limit that was set when the group had one borrowing entity may be irrelevant now that it has five.
The output should be a concise policy, a clear authority matrix and a reporting schedule. The aim is not to turn treasury into a central bureaucracy. It is to give the board confidence that the group's cash, counterparties and currency exposures are being managed within agreed boundaries. That is a control objective, not a centralisation programme.
The board's role
The board's role is to set the appetite, approve the policy and challenge the reporting. It should not be approving routine transfers or individual hedges. It should be asking whether the policy is current, whether the limits are being observed and whether the reporting gives a true picture of the group's liquidity. In a group with multiple entities, that is a more useful form of control than a longer approval queue.